Overview & Project Scope

The Lagos–Calabar Coastal Highway, envisioned as a 700-kilometre corridor connecting nine of Nigeria’s coastal states (Lagos, Ogun, Ondo, Edo, Delta, Bayelsa, Rivers, Akwa Ibom, and Cross River), represents one of the nation’s most ambitious infrastructure undertakings. However, the project has been marred by a sprawling list of irregularities, ranging from opaque procurement processes and disputed financial figures to profound environmental and human rights concerns. While proponents tout its economic necessity, critics warn that the lack of transparency across legal, financial, and ecological fronts could expose Nigeria to massive debt and project failure.

Federal Power, State Rights, and Legal Oversight

The interjurisdictional nature of the project raises intricate constitutional questions regarding the distribution of powers between the federal and state governments. The Nigerian Constitution vests legislative and executive authority in both tiers of government, creating a system of concurrent responsibilities that often generates interpretive tension when federal initiatives extend into matters traditionally reserved for state control. Land administration, in particular, falls under the purview of state governors pursuant to the Land Use Act, which vests all land in each state in the governor to hold in trust for the people.

However, when federally initiated infrastructure projects, such as the Lagos–Calabar Coastal Highway, traverse multiple states, the demarcation of authority becomes less clear. The Supreme Court of Nigeria, in Attorney-General of the Federation v. Attorney-General of Abia State & 35 Others (2002) S.C. 28/2001; [2002] NGSC 4 (4 April 2002), addressed similar jurisdictional ambiguities. In that landmark decision, the Court examined the constitutional balance between federal competence and state sovereignty, holding that while the Federal Government possesses the power to execute projects of national importance, such authority does not extinguish the states’ constitutional rights over land within their territories.

The Mammoth Cost and Plausible Inflation

The sheer scale of the project’s financing has dominated public discourse. At the onset, the figure presented for the full 700 km route was ₦2.8 trillion, based on an initial cost per kilometre of about ₦4.0–₦4.39 billion. This initial estimate translates roughly to US$11 billion in consolidated projections.

However, the per-kilometre cost figures have fluctuated dramatically, signalling either changing scope or opaque accounting. Minister David Umahi later clarified figures suggesting a cost of ₦7.5 billion per km for a “standard coastal highway” that included complex features like shore protection, solar lighting, and retaining walls. More critically, opposition figures have cited estimates that project the total cost as high as ₦15.7 trillion, based on extrapolating the high cost of the initial 47.47 km pilot stretch.

Cost Realism vs. Cost Drivers

The official headline rate of approximately US$15–16 million per kilometre (using the US$11 billion total) sits within a plausible band for standard, on-land expressways in similar emerging markets. However, this average is highly misleading. Experts note that coastal projects requiring heavy marine engineering, land reclamation, viaducts, or tunnels can increase unit costs exponentially, potentially reaching US$50 million to US$350 million per kilometre (benchmarking against complex projects like the Mumbai Coastal Road or the Hong Kong–Zhuhai–Macau Bridge).

• Earthworks and Reclamation: Filling coastal wetlands and building embankments is exceptionally expensive.
• Shore Protection/Sea Defences: Features like rock armour and seawalls add large capital costs.
• Bridges and Causeways: Extensive crossings over creeks and riverine areas inflate the unit rate rapidly.

International Comparative Projects and Cost Realism

Procurement and Governance Irregularities

The award of the contract to Hitech Construction Company Ltd. has been the focus of intense scrutiny, raising serious questions about compliance with Nigerian procurement law.

The Restrictive Award Process

The primary irregularity is the allegation that the contract was awarded without full open competitive tendering. The government, through the Minister of Works, acknowledged that the initial Phase 1, Section 1 (~47.47 km) was awarded via restrictive bidding, citing the unique technical requirements of the concrete carriageway in coastal conditions (specifically, requiring companies with “up to five concrete pavers”).

Legal and Transparency Flaws

• Violation of PPA: If the restriction of competition was not legally justified, the award can be challenged for non-compliance with the PPA.
• Lack of Transparency: Crucial documentation, such as the full evaluation reports, technical and financial bid comparisons, and contract award notices, have not been fully published. This lack of disclosure prevents verification of the selection principle (the “least evaluated responsive bidder”).
• Conflict of Interest: Concerns have been raised about the links between Hitech and business interests close to the presidency, which, even if not proven, creates a high risk of reputational and political scrutiny.

Financial Legality and Opaque Debt

The financing structure for the highway, characterized as a Public-Private Partnership (PPP) or EPC + Finance hybrid, introduces major legal and fiscal risks, particularly concerning debt management.

Borrowing and Undisclosed Terms

For the initial 47.47 km section, the Federal Government secured a US$747 million syndicated loan facility (led by Deutsche Bank), supplemented by an additional US$100 million from the ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development (EBID).

Ecological and Social Fallout

The construction has already triggered immediate environmental and human rights controversies.

Environmental Non-Compliance

Critics, including environmental groups, warn that the highway route cuts through ecologically sensitive mangroves and wetlands, risking habitat loss, saltwater intrusion, and increased coastal erosion.

Demolition and Property Rights

Demolitions have occurred along the alignment in Lagos (e.g., portions of Landmark properties) and other areas, leading to protests and legal challenges. Affected owners complain of opaque valuation and inadequate compensation.

Timeline and Cost Volatility During Delivery

The Lagos–Calabar Coastal Highway is not a single construction contract but a long-term program. The full 700 km corridor is expected to be delivered over about eight years (implying full completion around 2033).

Conclusion: Demanding Accountability

The Lagos–Calabar Coastal Highway is at a critical juncture where ambition must meet accountability. The project exhibits multiple credible red flags across procurement, finance, environment, and compensation. Failure to address these irregularities could invalidate aspects of the contract, expose the Nigerian government to significant liabilities, and ultimately delay completion.

Key Demands for Transparency and Accountability

• Cost and Procurement Audit: Publish the full Bill of Quantities (BoQ), unit rates for specialized marine works, and the independent engineer’s cost validation report. Disclose the justification for using restrictive bidding and publish the evaluation reports that led to the award to Hitech.
• Financial Disclosure: Publish the full loan term sheets, guarantee instruments, repayment schedules, and DMO approvals related to the US$747 million facility.
• Environmental and Social Compliance: Publish the final EIA report, ESMP, and Resettlement Action Plans (RAP), including compensation registers and grievance logs, to verify legal compliance and protect affected communities.